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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Fulton appeals from his Judgement of Conviction for sexual battery of minor child
sixteen or seventeen years of age. On appeal, Mr. Fulton raises numerous issues. He asserts that
he was denied his right to due process because of two distinct fatal variances between the
charging document and the jury instructions, one related to the elements instruction and one
related to the statutory instruction. He also asserts that the jury instructions were rife with error,
resulting in jury instructions that were confusing and misleading to the jury, impermissibly
lowered the State’s burden of proof, and ultimately prejudiced the defense.

Additionally,

Mr. Fulton asserts that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct which deprived him of a
fair trial. Next, he asserts that the district court violated his right to due process of law by
incorrectly instructing the jury, in response to a jury question. Furthermore, Mr. Fulton asserts
that he was denied due process of law when the jury returned a verdict of guilty for “Sexual
Abuse of a Child Amounting to Lewd and Lascivious Conduct,” a crime with which he had not
been charged and, again, when the district court entered a Judgment of Conviction for the crime
of “Sexual Battery of a Minor Child Sixteen or Seventeen Years of Age, a violation of Idaho
Code Section 18-1508A(1)(a),” a crime for which he had not been convicted. In addition,
Mr. Fulton asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. Finally,
Mr. Fulton asserts that the errors are not harmless or, alternatively, that the errors amount to
cumulative error, depriving him of his right to a fair trial.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s assertions to the contrary.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Fulton’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES1
I.

Did a fatal variance exist between the charging document and the jury instructions
(elements instruction)?

II.

Did a fatal variance exist between the charging document and the jury instructions
(statutory instruction)?

III.

Did the jury instructions confuse or mislead the jury, lower the State’s burden of proof,
and prejudice Mr. Fulton?

IV.

Did the State violate Mr. Fulton’s right to a fair trial by committing prosecutorial
misconduct?

V.

Did the district court violate Mr. Fulton his right to due process of law when it incorrectly
defined lewd and lascivious conduct, in response to a jury question?

VI.

Was Mr. Fulton’s right to due process of law violated when the jury was allowed to
return a verdict for a crime with which he had not been charged and when the district
court entered a Judgment of Conviction for a crime with which he had not been
convicted?

VII.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Fulton’s motion for a mistrial?

VIII. 2 Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Fulton’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law violated because the accumulation of errors
deprived him of his right to a fair trial?

1

The State chose to “consolidate and rephrase the issues” on appeal. In an effort to attempt to
limit reader confusion, Mr. Fulton provides the following limited guide to locating the issues:
Appellant’s Issues I, II, III, V, and VI are addressed in Respondent’s Issue 5. Appellant’s Issue
IV is addressed in Respondent’s Issues 1 and 4. Appellant’s Issue VII is addressed in
Respondent’s Issue 2. And, Appellant’s Issue VIII is addressed in Respondent’s Issue 3.
Further, Mr. Fulton asserts that may be a violation of I.A.R. 35 to reorganize and rephrase
the issues on appeal as the State has not asserted that Mr. Fulton’s issues were insufficient or
incomplete. I.A.R. 35(b)(4).
2
Mr. Fulton will not be providing a response to the issue of cumulative error because the State’s
argument on this issue is unremarkable.
3

ARGUMENT
I.
A Fatal Variance Existed Between The Charging Document And The Jury Instructions:
Elements Instruction

A.

The Error Is Reviewable As Fundamental Error
The State has asserted that Mr. Fulton is not entitled to review of this issue because issues

related to the instruction of the jury cannot be raised under fundamental error. (Respondent’s
Brief, pp.23-24.) The State’s argument is misplaced. First, the State argues, relying on State v.
Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 919 (1981), that if a party does not object to an instruction, the right to
raise the objection on appeal is waived. (Respondent’s Brief, p.23.) The decision is based upon
I.C.R. 30. Carter, 103 Idaho at 919. However, Carter did not address the issue of fundamental
error and without more analysis cannot stand for the proposition that jury instructions can never
be raised without an objection. 3

Id.

Certainly, Mr. Fulton agrees that this issue was not

specifically preserved for appeal; he has acknowledged as much by raising the issue as an issue
requiring review under fundamental error.
Next, the State argues that the version of Idaho Criminal Rule 30 in effect at the time of
Mr. Fulton’s trial prohibits the review of jury instruction issues. I.C.R. 30 states, “[n]o party
may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto
before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to which the party
objection and the grounds of the objection.” I.C.R. 30(b) (2004). However, while this Rule

3

In fact, several cases interpreting Carter specifically noted that the holding was limited to the
direct review of an unpreserved error and not to fundamental error, errors which were
continually reviewed on appeal. See State v. Randles, 115 Idaho 611, 617, n.4 (Ct. App.
1989), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 117 Idaho 344; State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 225, 229 (1990).
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prohibits review of unpreserved error, it cannot prohibit fundamental error review. This version
of I.C.R. 30 was in effect when the Idaho Supreme Court announced the new fundamental error
standards in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). The Perry Court was undoubtedly aware of
I.C.R. 30 when it discussed the fundamental error standards for the review of jury instruction
related questions and held that such errors could be raised as fundamental error for the first time
on appeal. Id. at 223-28. As such, Mr. Fulton maintains that errors related to jury instruction
can be raised as fundamental error.
The State has also argued that even if the “the claims of instructional error are not waived
by operation of the rule, Fulton affirmatively waived any objections to the instructions or special
verdict form” and that any error was invited. (Respondent’s Brief, pp.24-26.) The State’s
argument is baseless. First, there is not any evidence that Mr. Fulton requested the improper
instructions or, for that matter, any instructions. (R., pp.3-8.) It is true that Mr. Fulton did not
object to the jury instructions during trial. (Tr. Addenda, p.56, L.4 – p.58, L.16.) However, the
failure to object does not preclude review under fundamental error. In State v. Hall, 161 Idaho
413 (2016), the Idaho Supreme Court specifically noted that defense counsel’s failure to object
during the jury instruction conference limited appellate review of the jury instructions to review
via fundamental error.

Id. at 422.

While Court in Hall did not find error amounting to

fundamental error, it did not, in any way, limit the fundamental error review due to defense
counsel’s statement that there was no objection to the instructions. Id. at 422-425. Therefore,
Mr. Fulton’s failure to object and statements that there was “no objection,” like in Hall, does not
limit the fundamental error review of instructional issues.
Further, to the extent that the State is asserting that the failure to object was strategic, that
argument also fails. Mr. Fulton asserts that the failure to object was not a tactical decision. The
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State’s mere speculation that counsel’s failure to object was a tactical decision is insufficient for
a court to assume that the defense was attempting to sandbag. State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho 161,
166-67 (Ct. App. 2011). Like Sutton, in the case at hand, there is no indication that Mr. Fulton
knew more about the law than the State or the district court, there was no evidence that
Mr. Fulton was attempting to sandbag the court, and there is no evidence that Mr. Fulton
presented the erroneous instructions. Id. Instead, a review of the record suggests that Mr. Fulton
gained absolutely no strategic advantage by giving the jury an opportunity to convict him on
uncharged conduct that does not meet the definition of lewd conduct. Clearly, it would not be a
reasonable strategic decision to allow Mr. Fulton to be convicted of conduct that does not
constitute the crime charged simply for the sake of a potential appellate reversal.
Finally, the State has also asserted that Mr. Fulton has failed to provide an adequate
record on appeal because there was an informal jury instruction conference held in chambers
prior to the formal instruction conference held on the record. (Respondent’s Brief, p.25.) This
argument also fails. It would be impractical for a district court to conduct every discussion
between the parties on the record, but district courts should, at a minimum, provide an
opportunity to memorialize the in chambers discussion and create a record for appeal. The
formal instruction conference provided that opportunity and providing the formal instruction
conference as part of the appellate record satisfied Mr. Fulton’s duty to provide an adequate
record. Further, the error is apparent from the record provided. If the alleged violation is clear
from the record, additional facts are not required for analysis. State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214,
221 (2014). In this case, because the error is apparent from the record provided, no additional
materials are necessary for review of the issues.

6

B.

A Fatal Variance Existed Between The Charging Document And The Jury Instructions:
Elements Instruction
The State asserts that there was no variance because “the instructions were broader than

the charging document’s focus on manual-genital contact.” The State’s assertion is erroneous.
A variance may occur where there is a disparity between the allegations in the charging
instrument and the jury instructions. State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476, 479 (Ct. App. 2013) ; State v.
Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 165 (Ct. App. 2004). The instructions to the jury must match the
allegation in the charging document as to the means by which a defendant is alleged to have
committed the crime charged. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 147 (2007). If they do not, there
can be a fatal variance between the jury instructions and the charging document. State v. Folk,
151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011). Additionally, the jury instruction must not permit the defendant to
be convicted of conduct that does not constitute the type of crime charged. Id. Broadening the
conduct for which Mr. Fulton could be found guilty – allowing a jury to convict for conduct
other than manual-genital contact – is a variance.
Mr. Fulton maintains that the variance is fatal. In the Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Fulton relied
on several cases that stand for the proposition that the variance in his case is fatal. For example,
in a lewd conduct case, the Idaho Supreme Court, albeit with little analysis, noted that the jury
instruction must match the indictment to avoid a fatal variance. Hooper, 145 Idaho at 147.
Similarly, in Folk the jury was instructed, in response to a jury question that lewd
conduct referred to several categories of sexual touching including “oral-genital contact, genitalgenital contact, genital-anal contact, manual-genital contact, manual-anal contact, oral-anal
contact, etc.” Folk, 151 Idaho at 340. The Idaho Supreme Court found that this instruction was
erroneous because it included irrelevant information (only the oral-genital portion was relevant),
indicated that the jury could find Mr. Folk guilty of lewd and lascivious conduct rather than oral-
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genital conduct, and, by using the term “etc,” reinforced the idea that the jury could find the
defendant guilty of conduct other than oral-genital. Id. The Court held that, because there was
testimony relating to other conduct, it was possible that the jury may have convicted Mr. Folk for
conduct that does not constitute the crime of lewd conduct. Id. at 342. The Court impliedly held
that the instruction created a fatal variance. Id.
In yet another lewd conduct case, Day, the Idaho Court of Appeals found that it was a
fatal variance for the district court to instruct that Mr. Day could be convicted if the State proved
that he had “‘committed an act or acts of manual-genital contact or any other lewd or lascivious
act upon or with the body of’ the victim (emphasis added)” when he had only been charged with
committing lewd conduct by means of manual-genital contact. Day, 154 Idaho at 480. Again,
there was evidence of other sexual touching that would not legally amount to lewd conduct. Id.
at 480-81.
The legal errors in Folk and Day are strikingly similar to the error asserted in
Mr. Fulton’s case. He maintains that the variance in his case is also fatal. Neither the Idaho
Court of Appeals nor the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed the fatal variances in Hooper, Folk, or
Day by specifically addressing the question of whether the variance deprived the defendant of his
right to fair notice or left him open to double jeopardy risks. Mr. Fulton asserts that this was
because such analysis was superfluous. It was clear in each of these cases that defendant’s due
process rights had been violated and that the defendants had been deprived of fair notice that
they could be held criminally liable for additional conduct. Mr. Fulton asserts that the same
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logic applies in his case and that the variance in his case has also affected his substantial rights –
the right to fair notice.4
As such, jury instruction seven violated Mr. Fulton’s right to due process, and because he
meets all three prongs of Idaho’s fundamental error test, Mr. Fulton’s conviction must be
vacated.

II.
A Fatal Variance Existed Between The Charging Document And The Jury Instructions: Statutory
Instruction
The State did not separately address Appellant’s Issue I and II. (See Respondent’s Brief,
pp.22-32.) As such, Mr. Fulton’s arguments in response to the State’s arguments can be found
in Issue I above and are incorporated herein by reference. Mr. Fulton maintains that jury
instructions four and ten violated his right to due process, and because he meets all three prongs
of Idaho’s fundamental error test, Mr. Fulton’s conviction must be vacated.

4

The State has also asserted that the “claimed variance [does not] leave him open to the risk of
double jeopardy.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.27.) In the Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Fulton did not
specifically assert that the variance potentially put him in danger of a future double jeopardy
violation. However, in response to the State’s argument, Mr. Fulton does note that it is possible
that the variance does subject him to risk of a double jeopardy violation in that the Information
and Judgment of Conviction would prove a conviction only for manual-genital contact.
However, as argued by Mr. Fulton, it is possible that the jury convicted him for other sexual
contact that may be criminal. (See Issues I, II, III, IV, and V.) As such, there is possibility that
additional charges could be brought for the uncharged sexual acts, thereby resulting in the
possibility of multiple convictions for the same conduct.
9

III.
The Jury Instructions Confused Or Mislead The Jury, Lowered The State’s Burden Of Proof,
And Prejudiced Mr. Fulton

A.

The Error Is Reviewable As Fundamental Error
The State chose to address several of Mr. Fulton’s distinct issues cumulatively. (See

Respondent’s Brief, pp.22-32.)

In the interest of brevity, his arguments regarding the

fundamental error review, located in Issue I(A), are incorporated herein by reference.

B.

The Jury Instructions Confused Or Mislead The Jury, Lowered The State’s Burden Of
Proof, And Prejudiced Mr. Fulton
The State asserts that there was no error in offering surplus instructions because

Mr. Fulton has not shown he has a right to “streamlined instructions.” (Respondent’s Brief,
p.30.) This statement is a mischaracterization of the issue presented on appeal. Mr. Fulton has
not argued that he is entitled to “streamlined instructions.” (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.18-28.)
Instead, he has asserted that he has a right to accurate instructions, not instructions that misstate
the law, are apt to confuse the jury, create variances, and lower the State’s burden to prove each
element beyond a reasonable doubt. The instructions provided by the district court violated this
right.
The State next asserts that sexual battery of a minor not amounting to lewd conduct is a
lesser included offense of sexual battery of a minor amounting to lewd conduct. (Respondent’s
Brief, p.30.) This argument is specious as State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 529 (2011) has already
determined that sexual abuse of a child could not be a lesser included offense of lewd conduct
under the statutory theory because it is possible to commit lewd conduct without committing
sexual abuse. Comparing sections (a) and (b) of the sexual battery statute, I.C. § 18-1508A, is
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similar to comparing I.C. § 18-1508 lewd conduct and I.C. § 18-1506 sexual abuse. “Each of
these crimes requires proof of separate essential elements not required of the other and the
conviction of one will not bar conviction of the other.” Flegel, 151 Idaho at 529 (quoting
State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 115 (1979)). Therefore, it was error to provide instructions
five and eight as they did not instruct on a lesser included offense. Regardless, the instructions
are also erroneous for other reasons, including containing incorrect statements of law and being
both confusing and misleading. The State did not address these arguments and has waived any
argument to the contrary.
Mr. Fulton’s right to due process was violated by the erroneous jury instructions, and
because he meets all three prongs of Idaho’s fundamental error test, his conviction must be
vacated.

IV.
The State Violated Mr. Fulton’s Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial Misconduct

A.

The State Violated Mr. Fulton’s Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial
Misconduct
The State has classified Mr. Fulton’s prosecutorial misconduct issues as two separate

issues: objected to misconduct and misconduct requiring a fundamental error analysis. However,
for ease of the reader, the issue presented by Mr. Fulton will again be addressed as a single issue.
1.

Misconduct For Which There Was No Objection

a.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Diminishing Its Burden
And/Or Attempting To Modify The Legal Requirements For Lewd And
Lascivious Conduct

The State has asserted that it was not erroneous for the prosecutor to encourage the jury
to find Mr. Fulton guilty of committing a crime defined by the statute, but for which he was not
11

charged. (Respondent’s Brief, p.15.) The State’s argument is critically flawed as it appears to be
based on the mistaken belief that Mr. Fulton could be convicted for any actions that may fall
under I.C. § 18-1508A. However, Mr. Fulton was specifically charged with committing the
sexual battery “by having Lewd and / or Lascivious contact with and / or upon the body of a
minor, D.B., a child sixteen or seventeen years of age, to-wit: sixteen years old, by manualgenital contact.” (R., p.44.) The charge was limited to specific conduct – lewd and lascivious
contact by manual-genital contact. As such, even though the statute also includes the phrase “or
who shall involve such minor child in any act of explicit sexual conduct,” that phrase and any
admitted conduct that may fall under its purview is inapplicable in the case at hand. Certainly,
the prosecution could have charged Mr. Fulton with additional conduct that may have been
criminal, but it chose not to do so. The State cannot now seek to uphold a faulty conviction
based upon theories that were disregarded during the charging process.
Mr. Fulton contends that the prosecution’s arguments to the jury were tantamount to a
request for the jury to disregard true Idaho law and find that Mr. Fulton’s admitted actions
(kissing D.B. and touching her breasts) amounted to lewd or lascivious conduct.

The

prosecution created flagrant error by arguing to the jury that it could convict Mr. Fulton of sexual
battery by means of lewd or lascivious conduct for conduct that could not legally amount to lewd
conduct.
The State has also argued that Mr. Fulton asserted that the “[S]tate also misrepresented
the law when it (correctly) argued that Fulton’s admitted conduct ‘can’t possibly be just simple
battery’ because it was sexual in nature.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.16.) Mr. Fulton never made
such a claim. Instead, he merely quoted the following:
It can’t possibly be just simple battery. It can’t possibly. There were sexual
events that occurred: touching of breast, making out, sitting on his lap, and

12

touching her genitals. These are sexual events that are lewd, that we don’t
accept in society.
(Tr. Addenda, p.97, Ls.8-13 (emphasis added).) This section was quoted for the purpose of
illustrating that the State was arguing that conduct, which does not legally amount to lewd
conduct, was lewd conduct, an argument explicitly presented by Mr. Fulton. (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.31-35.)
Mr. Fulton maintains that the prosecution’s assertions that kissing, touching the breasts,
removing a bra, and lap sitting amounted to lewd conduct was calculated to encourage the jury to
reach a guilty verdict based on an improper theory, rather than the facts of the case and their
legal application to the law. This argument violated Mr. Fulton’s rights to a fair trial and to due
process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

As such, this misconduct directly

implicates Mr. Fulton’s constitutional rights and is reviewable for fundamental error.
Additionally, the State did not argue, as it did in for other non-objected to misconduct,
that any potential error was harmless. Therefore, the State has conceded that error, if found, is
not harmless.

b.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Appealing To The Passions
And Prejudices Of The Jury

The State has asserted that Mr. Fulton has failed to cite to any Idaho authority in support
of his argument that a charge to the jury that they should find Mr. Fulton guilty to keep their
community, their grandchildren, children and others safe constituted misconduct. (Respondent’s
Brief, p.18.) The State is mistaken, as Mr. Fulton cited several Idaho cases which stand for the
proposition that appeals to the emotions, passions, or prejudices of the jury by means
inflammatory tactics are impermissible. (Appellant’s Brief, p.36.) Regardless, Mr. Fulton is not

13

required to limit his briefing to Idaho case law and relying on additional persuasive authority
such as United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2005), is entirely proper.
Further, Mr. Fulton quoted the following passage in the Appellant’s Brief:
This isn’t a pleasant experience for anyone. And most of all I’m proud of the
little victim to come forward, to prevent this type of activity. And do we want to
send a message? Certainly we do. But most of all we want justice, and that’s up
to you.
It’s been a pleasure, as much as it can be, being before you. This is what I
do. But these are the kind of cases that make you solemn, make you don’t sleep
at night, that make you worry about your grandchildren, your children, and others.
This is a good community. We must keep it that way.
(Tr. Addenda, p.97, L.19 – p.98, L.5.)
The State has chosen to focus on the first paragraph asserting that Mr. Fulton had asserted
that a request that the jury to find justice was prosecutorial misconduct. (Respondent’s Brief,
p.18.) However, Mr. Fulton made no such argument. Instead, he asserted that pleas to the jury
to protect the community, specifically their own grandchildren, children, and other children, by
convicting Mr. Fulton was improper. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.35-37.) If the prosecutor had
concluded the argument at the end of the first quoted paragraph, there would be no impropriety.
Yet, the prosecutor chose to cross the line, appeal to the jurors fears as in State v. Pecor, 132
Idaho 359, 367 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a statement in closing argument that the defendant
was a “[drug] dealer to your sons and daughters” was an improper appeal to the jurors’ fears),
and urge the jury to convict to protect community values as in Weathersoon, 410 F.3d at 1149.
Because the prosecutor’s statements were calculated to encourage the jury to reach a
guilty verdict based on its emotion, rather than the facts of the case, they were irrelevant and
improper and their admission violated Mr. Fulton’s rights to a fair trial and due process under the
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Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

As such, the misconduct in this case clearly violates

Mr. Fulton’s unwaived constitutional rights and deprived Mr. Fulton of his right to a fair trial.
Additionally, the State did not argue, as it did in for other non-objected to misconduct,
that any potential error was harmless. Therefore, the State has conceded that error, if found, is
not harmless.

c.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Vouching For The Alleged
Victim

Mr. Fulton quoted several instances where the prosecution interjected their personal
beliefs about the allegations or vouched for the alleged victim’s credibility. (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.37-38.) The State asserts that Mr. Fulton “cherry-picked” the quotes and took them out of
context. (Respondent’s Brief, p.19.) Mr. Fulton adamantly denies this allegation and asserts that
by quoting only relevant portions he has, in no way, manipulated the words or intent of the
prosecutor’s closing.
Next, the State asserts that Mr. Fulton has suggested that there is no binding authority
“stating that a prosecutor’s expression of a personal belief implicates, much less violates, a
constitutional right.”

(Respondent’s Brief, p.19.)

This is a gross misrepresentation of

Mr. Fulton’s briefing. Mr. Fulton did not make any such assertion. Citing, in a footnote, to an
unpublished opinion, noting that it is not binding precedent and that it is offered only as a recent
example of a similar issue, is not a concession that there is no binding authority on the subject.
Further, Mr. Fulton cited several binding cases that suggest that prosecutorial vouching is not
only improper, but also implicates a constitutional right. (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.37-40.)
The State also argues that the prosecutor’s comments were merely an expression of
“conviction in the [S]tate’s case.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.19.) Mr. Fulton maintains that the
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comments were far more egregious and that regardless of the State’s isolated comment that the
jury needed to draw its conclusions based on its own beliefs, the closing, when reviewed in its
entirety, was designed to inform the jury of the conclusions that they needed to reach because
they were the conclusions of the prosecutor.
The State then asserted that the vouching statements were made in response to
Mr. Fulton’s arguments in closing that the alleged victim was a good witness. (Respondent’s
Brief, pp.19-20.) This argument is specious for two reasons. First, only one of the alleged
instances of misconduct occurred after Mr. Fulton provided closing argument and it was the least
egregious of the quoted portions of closing arguments. As such, defense counsel’s actions could
not have induced the vast majority of the prosecutor’s improper vouching. Second, contrary to
the State’s assertion otherwise, defense counsel was not complimenting the alleged victim on her
ability to testify, but accusing her of presenting coached testimony or being a “trained witness.”
(Tr. Addenda, p.89, L.24 – p.90, L.25.)

In an ironic turn of events, the State took the

opportunity, while arguing that the State had not engaged in prosecutorial vouching, to engage in
vouching on appeal, stating “[t]he [S]tate agrees with defense counsel that D.B. was an
exceptional witness.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.20, n.4.)
The prosecutor’s vouching during closing argument is a violation of Mr. Fulton’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial to have a jury reach its decision on any factor other
than the evidence admitted at trial and the law as explained in the jury instructions and interfered
with the jury’s ability to make an impartial decision, thereby also interfering with Mr. Fulton’s
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. The misconduct in this case clearly violates his
unwaived constitutional rights and deprived him of his right to a fair trial.
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Finally, the State has argued that the misconduct is harmless because the vouching “did
not convey any impression that he was aware of evidence that had been withheld from the
jury . . .”

(Respondent’s Brief, p.20.)

Mr. Fulton strongly disagrees.

As noted in the

Appellant’s Brief:
The prosecutor’s vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing his
personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such
comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but
known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus
jeopardize the defendant’s right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence
presented to the jury; and the prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur
of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment
rather than its own view of the evidence.
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1985). Even if the prosecutor’s vouching comments
did not imply there was additional evidence, they nonetheless posed the second danger – that the
jury would trust the Government’s judgment rather than its own.

Additional arguments

regarding harmless error were presented in the Appellant’s Brief, section IV(C)(1)(f), and are
incorporated herein by reference.

d.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Disparaging Defense Counsel

The State has asserted that it was not misconduct to comment on the defense strategy and
that such comments did not disparage defense counsel. (Respondent’s Brief, pp.20-21.) The
State’s argument is misplaced as it fails to recognize that the prosecutor noted, after making a
comment about defense counsel, that “I don’t like to take personal shots at attorneys.”
(Tr. Addenda, p.95, Ls.15-18.) Clearly, the comments were more than a comment on defense
strategy.
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Additionally, the State did not argue, as it did in for other non-objected to misconduct,
that any potential error was harmless. Therefore, the State has conceded that error, if found, is
not harmless.

e.

The Alleged Instances Of Prosecutorial Misconduct Are Reviewable As
Fundamental Error

The State has asserted that Mr. Fulton cannot show that defense counsel’s failure to
object was not tactical. (Respondent’s Brief, p.21.) Mr. Fulton asserts that the failure to object
was not a tactical decision. The State’s mere speculating that it was a tactical decision to not
object is insufficient for a court to assume that the defense was attempting to sandbag. State v.
Sutton, 151 Idaho 161, 166-67 (Ct. App. 2011). Instead, a review of the record suggests no
reason to conclude that defense counsel elected, as a matter of trial strategy, to waive any
objection when the prosecution committed numerous instance of misconduct. In fact, the record
shows that when counsel recognized misconduct he did object, as discussed in Section 2 of this
issue. Further, it cannot be a tactical decision on the part of the defense to have a jury reach a
verdict, not based on the evidence and law, but based on impermissible grounds presented
through misconduct.

2.

Misconduct For Which There Was An Objection: The Prosecution Committed
Misconduct By Appealing To The Passions And Prejudices Of The Jury

During closing argument, the prosecution made the following inappropriate argument:
“And in this case the defendant takes the stand and says, ‘I did this and this and this.’ But what’s
he trying to do to you?

He’s trying to gain your confidence.

(Tr. Addenda, p.85, Ls.17-21.)
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He’s grooming you.”

The State asserts that the prosecution’s statement that Mr. Fulton was “grooming” them
did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct because the term was not tied to sexual conduct and
because it merely invited the jury to question credibility. Both assertions are incorrect.
First, the State asserts that “neither officer tied ‘grooming’ to sexual conduct, much less
illicit sexual conduct.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.6.) This is a blatant misrepresentation of the
testimony. By the time the relevant testimony was offered, it was clear that Mr. Fulton was on
trial for allegedly engaging in sexual conduct with D.B. The only relevant testimony regarding
grooming would be in context of the charged offense. Officer Crane testified that “’grooming,’
in the sense that we’re talking about” was “[manipulating] another person to get them to do what
they want.” (Tr. Trial, p.37, Ls.17-20.) Clearly, Officer Crane was discussing what grooming
meant in relation to the case at hand – grooming in relation to sexual conduct. Similarly,
Detective Tower also testified about grooming in the context of child sexual abuse. (Tr. Trial,
p.72, L.1 – p.74, L.12.) He noted that “[g]rooming is behavior that . . . people will engage in –
where they do things with alleged victims or people that they want to perpetrate crimes on,
where they cause this potential victim to be more comfortable with them, to become more
trusting with them so that it opens up the door to the inappropriate behavior.” (Tr. Trial, p.72,
Ls.4-11.)

Immediately after offering his definition, he was asked to define “lewd and

lascivious.” (Tr. Trial, p.72, L.24 – p.73, L.3.) Detective Tower then testified that he observed a
pattern of grooming in the case at hand. (Tr. Trial, p.73, Ls.20-23.) Again, there can be no
doubt that the testimony was discussing grooming in relation to child sexual abuse. Therefore,
contrary to the State’s assertion otherwise, the term “grooming” was used as “a loaded term” in
Mr. Fulton’s case and it is clear the jury would have understood the prosecutor’s reference to the
term in closing argument.
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Next, the State asserts that the prosecutor’s argument was merely an invitation for the
jurors “to consider the possibility that Fulton was admitting some criminal conduct to make his
(false) partial denial seem more plausible.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.6.) However, the State
concedes that “it would be objectionable to argue to the jury that the purpose of Fulton’s
admissions was merely to manipulate the jurors.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.6.) There is no
distinguishable difference. The prosecutor was suggesting to the jury that Mr. Fulton had made
certain admissions to effectively manipulate the jury into believing his (false) denial. Either way
the State choses to describe the prosecutor’s goal, it is clear the prosecutor asserted that
Mr. Fulton was “grooming” the jury. (Tr. Addenda, p.85, Ls.17-21.) This statement, when in
the context of a child sexual abuse trial, is unfairly prejudicial as it impermissibly appeals to the
emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics designed to make
them feel like victims. See State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769 (1993); State v. Smith, 117
Idaho 891, 898 (1990); State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 844 (1982); State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho
163, 168 (1980); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct. App. 2007).
Additionally, the State has asserted that any prejudice was cured by a general instruction
provided to the jury that the attorneys’ arguments are not evidence. (Respondent’s Brief, p.7.)
However, this pattern instruction is given in all cases and is not a blanket invitation for a
prosecutor to make egregious statements or attempt to prejudice the jury without fear that it will
be held accountable for the misconduct. It should not be relied upon as a cure-all for any
prosecutorial misconduct as it is often insufficient to cure the error. This is especially true when
the statement is calculated to encourage the jury to evaluate the evidence and reach a guilty
verdict based on its emotion or prejudices through inflammatory tactics that directly undermine
the district court’s instructions. The State failed to provide any additional arguments regarding
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harmless error and, as such, Mr. Fulton asserts the State failed to meet its burden to prove that
the error was harmless.

V.
The District Court Violated Mr. Fulton’s Right To Due Process Of Law By Incorrectly Defining
Lewd And Lascivious Conduct In Response To A Jury Question

A.

The Error Is Reviewable As Fundamental Error
As noted above, the State chose to address several of Mr. Fulton’s distinct issues

cumulatively. (See Respondent’s Brief, pp.22-32.) In the interest of brevity, his arguments
regarding the fundamental error review, located in Issue I(A), are incorporated herein by
reference.
In addition to the cumulative argument, the State again specifically noted that in order for
Mr. Fulton to raise this issue on appeal, he had to object to the instruction. (Respondent’s Brief,
p.32.) Mr. Fulton maintains that relevant authority stands for the proposition that unpreserved,
alleged jury instruction errors can be presented for the first time on appeal, through fundamental
error review. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010); State v. Hall, 161 Idaho 413 (2016).
The State also reiterated its argument that Mr. Fulton failed to provide a sufficient record
for review of the issue. (Respondent’s Brief, p.32.) Contrary to the State’s assertion, the error is
apparent from the record provided. If the alleged violation is clear from the record, additional
facts are not required for analysis. State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 221 (2014). In this case,
because the error is apparent from the record provided, no additional materials are necessary for
review of the issue.
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B.

The District Court Violated Mr. Fulton’s Right To Due Process Of Law By Incorrectly
Defining Lewd And Lascivious Conduct In Response To A Jury Question
The State has asserted that it was not erroneous for the district court to use the definition

of lewd and lascivious conduct from State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50 (1952), because Evans has not
been specifically overturned. (Respondent’s Brief, pp.31-32.) The State argument is flawed for
several reasons. First, although Evans has not been specifically overruled, State v. Folk, 151
Idaho 327 (2011), effectively disavowed the use of a definition of lewd conduct other than the
specified conduct in the statue including genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital
contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact, and manual-genital contact. Id. at 339-42.
Further, in Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 567 F.Supp. 1371 (1983), a federal district judge
held that the wording of Idaho Code § 18–6607, the former lewd conduct statute, was
unconstitutionally vague and suggested that the statute be amended to identify the specific
conduct prohibited. Id. at 1376 -1379. The Idaho legislature took the judge’s suggestion and
amended the statute. As such, the legislature changed the law and rendered the definition used in
Evans legally ineffective. From 1984 on, lewd conduct has specifically identified several types
of sexual contact, including genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact,
oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact, or manual-genital contact. I.C. § 18-1508.
As such, the district court’s use of the definitions from Evans was erroneous. Much like
the federal district court found in 1983, the definitions provided by the district court were vague
and provided the jury with an opportunity to find that conduct other than the charged manualgenital could amount to lewd conduct for the purposes of sexual battery. Because the erroneous
jury instruction violated Mr. Fulton’s right to due process, and because he meets all three prongs
of Idaho’s fundamental error test, Mr. Fulton’s conviction must be vacated.
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VI.
Mr. Fulton’s Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated When The Jury Was Allowed To
Return A Verdict For A Crime With Which He Had Not Been Charged And When The District
Court Entered A Judgment Of Conviction For A Crime With Which He Had Not Been
Convicted

A.

The Error Is Reviewable As Fundamental Error
As noted above, the State chose to address several of Mr. Fulton’s distinct issues

cumulatively. (See Respondent’s Brief, pp.22-32.) In the interest of brevity, his arguments
regarding the fundamental error review, located in Issue I(A), are incorporated herein by
reference.

B.

Mr. Fulton’s Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated When The Jury Was Allowed
To Return A Verdict For A Crime With Which He Had Not Been Charged And When
The District Court Entered A Judgment Of Conviction For A Crime With Which He Had
Not Been Convicted
Additionally, the State has asserted that there was no error in allowing the jury to return a

guilty verdict for a crime that Mr. Fulton had not been charged with because the jury
instructions, other than the verdict form, did not instruct on “sexual abuse” but on “sexual
battery.” (Respondent’s Brief, pp.28-29.) While the State is correct about the language used in
the jury instructions, the inquiry cannot end there. For example, it would be impermissible for a
jury to be instructed on grand theft and then fill out a verdict form finding a defendant guilty of
petit theft and, ultimately, have the district court enter a judgment of conviction for grand theft.
It would be impossible for the Court to determine if the jury meant to convict for grand theft or if
they believed they were actually entering a verdict for the lesser offense. The terms “petit” and
“grand” have legally distinct meaning, much the same as the terms “battery” and “abuse” have
distinct meaning. Mr. Fulton’s conviction for a crime with which he had not been charged
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(sexual abuse) and punished for a crime for which he has not been found guilty (sexual battery)
is amounts to a serious due process violation.
The State has also asserted that there is no error because the crime for which Mr. Fulton
was charged would have a different name if it had occurred in Utah. (Respondent’s Brief, p.29.)
Mr. Fulton is unaware of any authority that stands for the proposition that variances are not fatal
as long as the terms used are proper in other states. He asserts that this argument is baseless.
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996). To the extent the State is merely making an idle
observation, he asserts such observation is irrelevant to the review of the issue.
Mr. Fulton’s right to due process was violated when he was convicted of a crime for
which he was not charged and punished for a crime for which he had not been found guilty, and
because he meets all three prongs of Idaho’s fundamental error test, his conviction must be
vacated.

VII.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Fulton’s Motion For A Mistrial
During the reading of the jury instructions, the district court read instructions four and
five, which each contained language from the sexual battery statute. (Tr. Addenda, p.62, L.18 –
p.65, L.1.) Both instructions included the statement, “It is a felony for . . . .” (Tr. Addenda,
p.62, L.18 – p.65, L.1.) Defense counsel objected during the reading of the jury instructions and
the district court instructed the jury to mark out the word “felony” and replace it with the word
“crime.”

(Tr. Addenda, p.62, L.18 – p.65, L.1.)

Defense counsel moved for a mistrial.

(Tr. Trial, p.161, L.20 – p.164, L.11.) Mr. Fulton asserts that the motion was erroneously
denied.
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On appeal, the State asserts that it was not “error to instruct the jurors using the literal
words of the statue.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.10.) Mr. Fulton agrees that “[o]rdinarily the
language employed by the legislature in defining a crime is deemed to be best suited for that
purpose, and error cannot be predicated on its use in jury instructions.” State v. Zichko, 129
Idaho 259, 264 (1996). However, the term “felony” was not used to “define the crime” but to
articulate the severity of the crime and the warranting of a harsher punishment. Therefore, the
cases cited by the State provide no guidance on whether it is erroneous to use the term felony
when instructing the jury, regardless of use of the word in the Idaho Code.
Instead, Mr. Fulton asserts that a proper instruction for sexual battery would follow ICJI
928 Sexual Battery of a Child. Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions are presumptively correct
statements of law, and trial courts are expected to use them unless another instruction would
more adequately, accurately, or clearly state the applicable law. State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 85
(Ct. App. 2011). The word felony does not appear in ICJI 928. Presumably, this is because the
Idaho Supreme Court, in approving the pattern instruction, found that the word felony was
inappropriate to include in the instruction. Evidently, the district court also found that the use of
the word felony was problematic as it altered the instructions to the jury and noted that it had
“fixe[d] any issue.” (Tr. Trial, p.166, L.9.; Tr. Addenda, p.63, L.5 – p.65, L.18.) As such,
Mr. Fulton maintains that it is error to initially include the word felony in the instruction.
The State also asserts that there was no prejudice for several reasons. None of the State’s
arguments are persuasive. First, the State argues that there was no prejudice because “the district
court had the instructions amended to ‘crime’ instead of ‘felony,’ and this Court presumes that
the jury heeded the court’s instructions.”
misplaced.

(Respondent’s Brief, p.10.)

This argument is

The jury was directed to replace the word “felony” with the word “crime.”
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(Tr. Addenda, p.62, L.18 – p.65, L.1.) However, the jury was never specifically instructed to not
consider that the crime was a felony. As such, even a jury strictly following the district court’s
instructions may still consider the “crime” a “felony” as the word “crime” does not specifically
exclude felonies.
The State then asserted that “no reasonable juror aware of the nuanced distinctions
between ‘crimes,’ ‘felonies,’ and ‘misdemeanors’ could believe that sexually battering a minor
would constitute anything less than a felony . . . ” (Respondent’s Brief, p.11.) The State
assumes that jurors sitting in Mr. Fulton’s case were “aware of the nuanced distinctions.”
However, there is no evidence in the record to support that assertion and the State is merely
speculating about the knowledge of the jury.
Finally, the State argues that the term “felony” is prejudicial to the State, not the defense.
(Respondent’s Brief, p.11.) The State does not support this assertion with argument, but merely
disagrees with Mr. Fulton who has argued that the term is prejudicial to defendants. Mr. Fulton
maintains that the exclusion of the terms “felony” and “misdemeanor” from the majority of
instructions, the desire to have jurors not consider punishment, the stigma associated with the
term, and the legal consequences of a felony conviction support that the use of the term is
improper and inherently prejudicial. The term must be legally prejudicial to Mr. Fulton, not the
State, as the prejudice implicates the right to a fair trial; a right exclusively noted in the U.S.
Idaho Constitutions as the right of a defendant, not the State. See U.S. CONST. amends. V and
XIV; ID. CONST. art. I, §13.
As such, Mr. Fulton asserts that the including the word felony in the initial version of the
jury instructions was erroneous and highlighting the charge as a felony, when altering the
instructions, had an overwhelmingly prejudicial effect. There is a great danger that the jury did
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not disregard the term, but that it considered it to Mr. Fulton’s detriment. He asserts that it was
reversible error for the district court to deny the motion for mistrial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Fulton respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand this
case for a new trial.
DATED this 8th day of February, 2018.

___________/s/______________
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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